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LABOUR MARKET REFORM AND INCIDENCE OF CHILD LABOUR IN A 
DEVELOPING ECONOMY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The incidence of child labour is a slur on the fair face of the globalized world. According to ILO 
(2002) one in every six children aged between 5 and 17 - or 246 million children are involved in 
child labour.1 Out of 246 million about 170 million child workers were found in different 
hazardous works. However, after economic liberalization the problem of child labour has 
decreased satisfactorily in most of the developing economies. ILO (2006) has reported that the 
number of economically active children in the 5-14 age group declined by 11 per cent in 2004 
from the 2000 figure. Advocates of liberalized policies believed that economic reforms would 
take the developing countries into higher growth orbits, the benefits of which would definitely 
percolate down to the bottom of the society, thereby leading to reduction of poverty and poverty-
driven child labour incidence.  
 
The developing countries have chosen free trade as their development strategy and been 
vigorously implementing liberalized trade and investment policies for the last two decades or so. 
Although the pace of economic reforms has been different across countries, radical measures for 
reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure freer global 
trade have already been undertaken in manufacturing commodities. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) norms have been liberalized considerably. Several sectors, hitherto protected, have now 
been opened up to foreign capitalists so that inflows of foreign capital take place in abundance in 
order to facilitate economic growth. After satisfactory progress in trade and investment reforms 
many of the developing countries including India are now seriously thinking in terms of 
implementing reforms in the labour market which has been a crucial aspect in the reform agenda. 
It is argued that rigid labour laws are serious impediments to the profitability of the capitalists. If 
wages are high and investors are unable to retrench redundant workers, close down unviable 
                                                           
1 If the “invisible” workers who perform unpaid and household jobs are included, it is likely that the 
estimate would shoot up significantly further. 
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units and relocate their businesses within the economy, they would not be able to compete 
effectively with other countries where labour laws are relatively flexible. Consequently, they 
would be forced to pull their shutters down which will lead to widespread open unemployment. 
According to this line of argument labour market reforms should get top priority even for the 
betterment of the working class as a whole given the grave unemployment situations in the 
developing countries.        
 
It is needless to point out that liberalization of labour laws is a very much politically sensitive 
issue. It is apprehended by the trade unions that any relaxation of labour laws will lead to general 
wage reductions of the poorer groups of the working population engaged in different sectors of 
the economy and accentuate wage inequality and the unemployment problem. Consequently, 
such a move is also expected to increase poverty and affect the child labour problem adversely.  
As labour markets take a longer time to adjust vis-à-vis the capital markets, the working class 
has to face substantial adjustment costs, especially at the early stages of labour market reforms.  
 
Empirical studies e.g. Cigno et al. (2002), Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) and Neumayer and 
Soysa (2005) have reported that trade and investment reforms have produced a favorable impact 
on child labour. However, as the labour market reforms are yet to be phased in one cannot judge 
empirically the consequences of such liberalization on the labour market and the incidence of 
child labour in the developing countries. 
 
Under the circumstances, it would be an interesting theoretical exercise to analyze the effects of 
labour market reform on the incidence of child labour and economic well-being of the child 
labour supplying families. A two-sector full-employment general equilibrium structure has been 
used for the analytical purpose. Sector 1 is agriculture that produces its output by means of adult 
labour, child labour and capital. On the other hand, sector 2 uses adult labour and capital to 
produce a manufacturing commodity. There is imperfection in the market for adult labour which 
is a salient feature of the developing countries. The adult workers in sector 2 are organized and 
receive a high unionized wage while their counterparts in sector 1 receive the competitive wage. 
Using such a framework we shall show that labour market reform indeed leads to a general wage 
5 
 
reduction. Not only the adult wages but also the child wage decrease. As the informal wage 
decreases but the formal sector expands the number of poor people declines although the 
conditions of the poor workers who still remain in the informal sector deteriorate. Although this 
policy is likely to lower the incidence of child labour the welfare of the families supplying child 
labour worsens. The paper, thus, finds that there might exist a trade-off between the economy’s 
twin objectives of lowering the incidence of child labour and improving the welfare of the poor 
working families. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We consider a small open economy with two sectors: informal and formal. There are three 
factors of production, adult labour ( L ), child labour ( CL ) and capital ( K ). All the three inputs 
are fully employed. The informal sector (sector 1) uses both adult labour and child labour apart 
from capital to produce an agricultural commodity, 1X . The formal sector, on the other hand, 
produces a manufacturing commodity, 2X , by means of capital and adult labour. Child labour is 
a specific input in sector 1. Adult labour is imperfectly mobile while capital is completely mobile 
between the two sectors of the economy. There are imperfections in the market for adult labour. 
Adult workers in sector 2 are organized and they receive a high unionized wage, *W , while their 
counterparts in sector 1 earn only a competitive wage,W with *W W . Sector 2 uses capital 
more intensively with respect to adult labour vis-à-vis sector 1. Production functions exhibit 
constant returns to scale with positive and diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. 
Markets, except the formal unskilled labour market, are perfectly competitive. Owing to our 
small open economy assumption both the commodity prices are given internationally. Finally, 
we assume that any two factors are substitutes to each other in the different sectors. This means 
that any cross partials of the factor coefficients are positive.  
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2.1   Derivation of Supply Function of Child Labour  
 
In this section, we derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing 
behaviour of the representative altruistic poor household. There are L numbers of homogeneous 
working families, which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult 
members. The adult workers who work in the higher paid formal manufacturing sector comprise 
the richer section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the 
informal sector constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and theoretical 
reason for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children to work out of 
sheer poverty.2 A distinctive paper in this regard is that of Basu and Van (1998).  Following their 
‘Luxury Axiom’ we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, 
W , from non-child labour sources, such that the parents will send their children out to work if 
and only if the actual adult wage rate is less than this critical level. We assume that each worker 
in the formal manufacturing sector earns a wage income, *W , sufficiently greater than this 
critical level. So, the workers belonging to this group do not send their children to work. On the 
other hand, adult workers employed in the informal sector earn W amount of wage income, 
which is less than W and, therefore, send many of their children to the job market to supplement 
low family income.  
 
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family is determined from the utility 
maximizing behaviour of the representative altruistic household. We assume that each working 
family consists of one adult member and ‘n’ number of children. The altruistic adult member of 
the family (guardian) decides the number of children to be sent to the work place. The utility 
function of the household is given by 
1 2( , , ( ))CV V C C n l                                                                                  (1)                      
                                                           
2 A good deal of research has focussed on the inextricable connection between poverty and child labour. 
See, for instance, Basu (1999), Basu and Tzannatos (2003), Edmonds (2001), Admassie (2002), Nagaraj 
(2002), Cartwright and Patrinos (1999), Wahba (2002), Cartwright (1999) and Grootaert and Patrinos 
(1999, 2002). They held poverty as the primary reason behind the child labour problem in the developing 
countries. 
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The household derives utility from the consumption of the final goods and from the children’s 
leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-Douglas type of the utility 
function.  
1 2( ) ( ) ( )CV A C C n l
                                                                                        (2) 
with 0A , 1 , , 0    ; and, ( ) 1.                            
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of  degree 1.  
 
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint.  
1 1 2 2 ( )C CPC P C W l W                                                                                    (3) 
where, W is the income of the adult worker and CC lW measures the income from child labour.  
Maximization of the utility function subject to the above budget constraint gives us the following 
labour supply function.3 
{( ) ( / )}C Cl n W W                                                                                             (4) 
 
This is the supply function of child labour by each poor family. We now analyze its properties. 
First, Cl varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise in W produces a positive income 
effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for his children and therefore decides to send 
a lower number of children to the workplace. An increase in CW , on the other hand, produces a 
negative price effect, which increases the supply of child labour from the family. 4 
 
There are 1 1( )I LL a X  number of adult workers engaged in the informal sector (sector 1) and 
each of them sends Cl  number of children to the workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply function 
of child labour in the economy is given by 
1 1[( ) ]C L
C
WL n a X
W
                                                                           (5) 
                                                           
3 See appendix I for mathematical derivation. 
 
4 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating supply func tion 
of child labour satisfying these two properties.  
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2.2 The General Equilibrium Analysis 
 
The general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of equations:  
1 1 1 1L C C KWa W a Ra P            (6) 
2 2 2* L KW a Ra P            (7) 
where sjia are input-output ratios. CW is the child wage rate while R is the return to capital. 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L            (8) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K            (9) 
1 1 1 1[( ) ]C L
C
Wa X n a X
W
             (10) 
Equations (6) and (7) are the two competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the two sectors. 
On the other hand, equations (8) − (10) are the full-employment conditions for adult labour, 
capital and child labour, respectively.  
 
The firms in the manufacturing sector have well-organized trade unions. One of the most 
important roles of the labour unions is to bargain with their respective employers in respect of 
the betterment of the working conditions.  Through offer of negotiation, threat of strike, actual 
strike etc. the trade unions exert pressure on the employers (firms) in order to secure higher 
wages, reduced hours of work, share in profits and other benefits. Organized workers in large 
firms leave no stones unturned so as to reap wages higher than their reservation wage i.e. the 
informal sector adult wage5. The relationship for the unionized wage rate is specified as 6: 
* *( , )W W W U                                                                                   (11) 
This function satisfies the following properties.  
*W W for 0, *U W W  for 0;( * / ), ( * / ) 0U W W W U      . 
                                                           
5 See Bhalotra (2002) in this context.  
 
6 Assuming that each formal sector firm has a separate trade union, the unionized wage function may be 
derived as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the representative 
union in the low-skill manufacturing sector. For detailed derivation see Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 
(2009).  
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Equation (7) states that in the absence of any bargaining power of the trade unions i.e. when 
0U  , the formal and informal sector wage rates are equal. However, the formal sector wage 
rate, *W , exceeds the competitive informal sector wage rate, W , when there is at least some 
power to the trade unions. The unionized wage is scaled upward as the informal wage rate rises. 
Also with an increase in the bargaining power, the unions bargain for a higher wage. The union 
power, denoted byU , is amenable to policy measures. If the government undertakes measures 
e.g. partial or complete ban on resorting to strikes by the trade unions, reformation of 
employment security laws to curb union power, U takes a lower value. 
 
Using (11) equation (7) can be rewritten as follows. 
2 2 2*( , ) L KW W U a Ra P                                                                                               (7.1) 
We rewrite equation (10) as follows: 
or, 1
1
( ) [( ) ]C
L C
a Wn
a W
                         (10.1) 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
The general equilibrium structure consists of six equations, namely equations (5), (6), (7.1), (8), 
(9) and (10.1) and the same number of variables: 1 2, , , ,CW W R X X and CL . This is an 
indecomposable system. So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor 
endowments. Given the child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a miniature 
Heckscher-Ohlin system as they use both adult unskilled labour and capital. It is sensible to 
assume that sector 1 is more adult labour-intensive than sector 2 with respect to capital. Totally 
differentiating equations (6), (7.1) and (10.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule the following 
proposition can be established7. 
Proposition 1:  A policy of labour market reform leads to (i) an increase in the return to capital; 
(ii) a decrease in the child wage if 1 1LK CKS S ; (iii) a decrease in the informal adult wage 
                                                           
7 These results have been proved in appendices II and III. 
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if 1 1LK CKS S ; and, (iv) a contraction of the informal sector both in terms of output and 
employment of adult labour. The policy raises (leaves unchanged) the ( / CW W ) ratio if and only 
if 1 1( )LK CKS S  .  
 
We explain proposition 1 as follows. A policy of labour market reform lowers the bargaining 
strength of the trade unions, U . This lowers the unionized wage *W . Consequently the return to 
capital, R , must rise to satisfy the zero-profit condition in sector 2 (equation (7.1)). Producers in 
both the sectors would be using less capital-intensive techniques than before. The capital-output 
ratios in the two sectors, 1Ka and 2Ka decrease. Given the product-mix there would occur an excess 
supply of capital that produces a Rybczynski-type effect. Consequently, sector 2 (sector 1) 
expands (contracts) as sector 2 is capital-intensive.  
 
As 1X falls and R rises there would be two opposite effects on the demand for each type of labour 
in sector 1. First, owing to contraction of this sector the demand for each type of labour falls 
which exerts downward pressures on the two wages. Secondly, as R rises producers in sector 1 
would be substituting capital by both adult and child labour although the degrees of 
substitutability of capital by the two types of labour differ. This raises the two labour-output 
ratios, 1La and 1Ca which in turn leads to increases in the demand for each type of labour given the 
output level. As a result of these two opposite effects the net outcome on the two 
wages,W and CW , would be ambiguous. In the case of child labour the first effect outweighs the 
second effect and the child wage declines if 1 1LK CKS S while the adult wage falls if
1 1
LK CKS S . 
However, if the partial elasticity of substitution between adult labour and capital, 1LKS ,is greater 
than (equal to) that between child labour and capital, 1CKS , the proportionate fall inW will be less 
than (equal to) that in CW . Consequently, the ( / CW W ) ratio rises (remains unchanged) and the 
supply of child labour by each family, Cl , falls (does not change) if and only if
1 1( )LK CKS S  .  
  
To examine the implication of labour market reform on the incidence of child labour in the 
economy we use the aggregate child labour supply function, which is given by equation (5). We 
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should note that the policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i) through a change in 
the size of the informal sector adult labour force, 1 1( )I LL a X , as these families are considered 
to be the suppliers of child labour (we call this the adult labour reallocation effect); and, (ii) 
through a change in Cl (the number of child workers supplied by each poor family), which results 
from a change in the ( / )CW W ratio (this may be called the relative wage effect). 
 
Differentiating equation (5) one can establish the following proposition.8 
Proposition 2: The labour market reform lowers the incidence of child labour in the economy 
if 1 1LK CKS S . 
 
Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. From proposition 1 we find that sector 1 
contracts both in terms of output and employment due to labour market reform. As the number of 
child labour supplying families falls the adult labour reallocation effect works favourably and 
causes the supply of child labour in the society to fall. On the other hand, the ( / CW W ) ratio rises 
(remains unchanged) and the supply of child labour by each family, Cl , falls (does not change) if 
and only if 1 1( )LK CKS S  . So when
1 1
LK CKS S both the relative wage effect and the adult labour 
reallocation effect work in the same direction and cause the child labour problem in the society 
to ameliorate. On the other hand, if 1 1( )LK CKS S , the relative wage effect is zero. Consequently, 
the family supply of child labour does not change although the aggregate supply of child labour 
in the economy falls due to the favourable adult labour reallocation effect.   
 
 
Finally, for examining the consequence of the labour market reform on the welfare (indirect 
utility) of the child labour supplying families we consider the utility function of the family given 
by equation (2). The family derives utility from its consumption of three commodities - 
children’s leisure, commodity 1 and commodity 2. Solving the first-order conditions of utility 
maximization and the budget constraint of the family the optimum consumption levels of the 
three commodities are obtained. Substitution of these values into the utility function gives the 
                                                           
8 See appendix IV for the mathematical proof. 
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optimum or indirectly utility of each child labour supplying family. Differentiating this indirect 
utility function one can easily prove the following proposition.9 
Proposition 3: The welfare (optimum utility) of the families that supply child labour worsens 
owing to labour market reform if 1 1LK CKS S .   
 
Proposition 3 is explained in the following fashion. Rewriting the budget constraint of each poor 
family we find that the family allocates its potential aggregate income, ( )CnW W , among the 
consumption of three commodities including children’s leisure. This income falls following 
labour market reform thereby lowering the consumption of commodities, 1 and 2 through 
negative income effects under the sufficient condition that 1 1LK CKS S . However, the change in the 
consumption of children’s leisure ( ( )Cn l ) is not so obvious. As the potential income 
falls, ( )Cn l falls due to negative income effect. But, it rises following a substitution effect as the 
relative price of this commodity, CW falls. The net result, therefore, depends on the relative 
strengths of the two effects. It is easy to show that the children’s leisure enjoyed by the family 
increases (remains unchanged) if and only if 1 1LK CKS S . What happens to the optimum utility of 
the family is somewhat inconclusive. However, it can be mathematically shown that the negative 
effects on utility of the decreases in the consumption of the first two commodities dominate over 
the positive effect of a possible increase in ( ( )Cn l ) under the sufficient condition 
that 1 1LK CKS S . Therefore, the policy of labour market reform is welfare-deteriorating to the poor 
child labour supplying families if 1 1LK CKS S .  
 
4. Concluding Remarks:  
 
This paper has examined the possible outcomes of labour market reform on the incidence of 
child labour and the welfare of the child labour supplying families in a developing economy. A 
two-sector full employment general equilibrium structure with child labour and imperfection in 
the market for adult labour has been deployed for the analytical purpose. A policy of labour 
                                                           
9 This has been proved in appendix V. 
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market reform lowers the extent of imperfection in the adult labour market and lowers the 
unionized wage that the adult workers receive in the organized sector that does not use child 
labour. The paper has found that liberalization in the labour market is indeed successful in 
lowering the incidence of child labour in the society although it affects the welfare of the child 
labour supplying families adversely. The analysis, therefore, questions the desirability of a policy 
that mitigates the child labour problem especially when it makes the poor families worse o ff.  
 
 
APPENDIX I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour 
 
 
Maximizing equation (2) with respect to 1 2,C C and Cl  and subject to the budget constraint (3) the 
following first-order conditions are obtained.  
1 1 2 2(( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( )) (( ) / ( ) )C CU PC U P C U n l W                              (A.1) 
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.  
)}/()({ 11 PWlnC CC                                                                                                     (A.2) 
)}/()({ 22 PWlnC CC                                                                                                         (A.3) 
                                               
Substitution of the values of 1C  and 2C  into the budget constraint and further simplifications give 
us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.  
{( ) ( / )}C Cl n W W                                                                                                  (4) 
 
APPENDIX II: Effects of labour market reform on W , CW and R  
 
Totally differentiating equations (6), (7.1) and (10.1) the following expressions are obtained.  
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0L C C KW W R              (A.4) 
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
L W K L UE W R E U              (A.5) 
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ˆ ˆ ˆ 0CAW BW CR             (A.6) 
where:  
(( * / )( / *)) 0WE W W W W    ; (( * / )( / *)) 0UE W U U W      
1 1( ) 0CL LL
C C
WA S S
W l
    ; 1 1( ) 0CC LC
C C
WB S S
W l
    ; and,    (A.7) 
1 1( )CK LKC S S                                                                                                
Here ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector; and, '' proportional change. 
k
jiS  the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , , ,Cj i L L K ; and, k = 
1,2. 0kjiS for ij  ; and, 0
k
jjS  .  
 
Writing equations (A.4) – (A.6) in a matrix notation we get 
1 1 1
2 2 2
ˆ        0            
ˆ ˆ    0      
ˆ          B       C         0
L C K
L W K C L U
W
E W E U
A R
  
  
                         
       (A.8) 
From (A.8) the determinant of the coefficient-matrix is obtained as 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( )K L W L K C K C L WB E A E C                  (A.9) 
       (-)               ( -)                       (+)  
(Note that 1 2 1 2( ) 0K L W L KE     as 1 0WE  and sector 2 is more capital-intensive than sector 
1 with respect to adult unskilled labour). 
 
From (A.9) it follows that 
0  if 0C  i.e. if 1 1LK CKS S          (A.10) 
 
Solving (A.8) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained.  
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2
1 1
ˆˆ ( )[ ]L U C K
E UW C B   

; 
2
1 1
ˆˆ ( )[ ]L UC K L
E UW A C   

; 
2
1 1
ˆˆ ( )[ ]L U L C
E UR B A   

;          (A.11) 
2
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )L UC
E CUW W  

 
2
ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( )L UB E UW R   

 
Note that 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0LL LC LK CL CC CKS S S S S S      . 
 
 
APPENDIX III: Effects of labour market reform on 1X and 1 1La X  
 
Differentiating equations (8) and (9), simplifying and writing in a matrix notation one obtains  
1 2 1
1 2 2
ˆ( )ˆ     
ˆ    ˆ( )
U
L L
K K U
E D UX
E EX U
 
 
         
        
        (A.12) 
where: ji proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector; 
2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 2[ ( ) ( )] 0L LL K C L L L LK LCD S A B S B S C          ; and, 
              (-)                (+)                             ( -)             
2 1 1
2 1 1 1 2[ ( ) ( )] 0K KL C L K L KC KLE S A B S A S B              (A.13) 
                            (+)                              (+)  
 
Solving (A.12) we get 
1 2 2
ˆˆ ( )[ ]U L K
E UX E D 

 

         (A.14) 
          (+)       (+)      ( -)         
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where: 1 2 2 1( ) 0L K L K               (A.15) 
(Note that sector 2 is more capital-intensive than sector 1 with respect to adult labour.)  
 
From (A.14) we find that 
1
ˆ 0X  when ˆ 0U  if 1 1LK CKS S .           (A.16) 
 
The number of poor families employed in the informal sector (sector 1) and supplying child 
labour, denoted as IL , is given by 
1 1I LL a X            (A.17) 
 
Differentiating (A.17) we get 
1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ( )I L LL LC C LKL a X S W S W S R X       
      1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )LC C LKS W W S R W X      
Using (A.11) and after simplification the above expression becomes  
1 1 1 12
1
ˆˆ ˆ( )[ ( ) ]L UI LK CC LC CK
C C
E U WL S S S S X
W l
    

       (A.18) 
              (+)       (+)        ( -)                 (-)      
 
Substituting the expression for 1Xˆ from (A.14) into (A.18), using (A.13) and (A.15) and after 
simplification one gets 
2 2 1 11 12 2
2 1
2
ˆ ( )( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )ˆ
C LI L L
K KL LK K KC KL
L
A BL S S S A S B
U
    
 
   

 
              (+)(+)                  (+)              (+)                     (+)      (-)           
                                                                           1 1 1 11{ ( ) }]K LK CC LC CK
C C
WS S S S
W l
     (A.19) 
                                                                                             (-)                     (+) 
 
From (A.19) it follows that IL falls whenU falls. So the informal sector contracts both in terms of 
output and employment of adult labour following labour market reform . 
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APPENDIX IV: Effect of labour market reform on CL  
 
Differentiating (5) we obtain 
1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( )( ) ( )C L C C L L
C
WdL a X W W l a X a X
W
      
Using (A.11) it is rewritten as 
1 1 12
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]L UC LL LC C LK
C C
W E CL U S W S W S R X
l W
      

 
or, 1 12 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]L UC LK LC C
C C
W E CL U S W R S W W X
l W
        

 
Using (A.7), (A.11), (A.13) and (A.14) and simplifying we obtain  
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 1 2
ˆˆ ( )[ { ( )( ) ( )}UC L K C L KL K LL K L KC KL
E UL A B S S S A S B      

    

 
           (+)                       (+)      ( -)                 ( -)                     (+)        ( -)                              
            1 1 1 1 1 1 122 2 1 2 1 2 1( ) ( ){ ( )}]LL L K LC CK LK CC L K CK K L LK CK
C C
WS S S S S S S
W l
              (A.20) 
                                                    (-) 
From (A.20) we find that 
ˆ 0CL  when ˆ 0U  if
1 1
LK CKS S .  
 
APPENDIX V: Effect of labour market reform on welfare of the poor families  
 
The budget equation of each child labour supplying family, given by (3), can be rewritten as 
follows. 
1 1 2 2 ( ) ( )C C CPC P C W n l nW W            (3.1) 
where ( )CnW W is the potential aggregate income of each family.  
 
From (4) one obtains 
( )( ) [ ]CC
C
nW Wn l
W
            (A.21) 
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Using (A.18) equations (A.2) and (A.3) can respectively be rewritten as  
1
1
( )[ ]CnW WC
P
            (A.2.1) 
2
2
( )[ ]CnW WC
P
            (A.3.1) 
(A.21), (A.2.1) and (A.3.1) show how the potential aggregate income of the family is distributed 
among the consumption of three commodities - children’s leisure, commodity 1 and commodity 
2, respectively.  
 
Let the potential aggregate income of each child labour supplying family be Z and is given by 
( )CZ nW W            (A.22) 
 
Differentiation of (A.22) with respect to U gives 
( ) [ ]CdWdZ dW n
dU dU dU
           (A.23) 
 
Using (A.7) and (A.11) and after simplification from (A.23) the following expression can be 
derived. 
1 12
1 1( ) [ ][( )( )( ) ( )]L U C L LK CK K C
C
EdZ WW n S S nW A WB
dU U W
       

    (A.24) 
                 (+)                                                                    (+)   ( -) 
 
From (A.24) it follows that 
( ) 0dZ
dU
 if 1 1LK CKS S           (A.25) 
From (A.2.1) and (A.3.1) it then follows that  
1( ) 0dC
dU
 ; and, 2( ) 0dC
dU
  if 1 1LK CKS S         (A.26) 
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From (A.25) and (A.26) we find that the potential aggregate income of each family, Z , and the 
consumption of the two commodities, 1C and 2C , fall following a policy of labour market reform 
under the sufficient condition that 1 1LK CKS S . 
  
Differentiating (A.21), using (A.11) and simplifying we find that  
1 12( )( ) ( )[ ]C L U CK LK
C
d n l E W S S
dU UW
  

        (A.27) 
So, the children’s leisure enjoyed by the family, ( )Cn l , increases (remains unchanged) 
following labour market reform if and only if 1 1( )LK CKS S  . 
 
Now consider equation (2). The poor household’s indirectly utility falls as 1C and 2C fall 
if 1 1LK CKS S . On the contrary, it rises (does not change) as ( )Cn l , increases (remains 
unchanged) if and only if 1 1( )LK CKS S  . The net result is thus inconclusive. However, it can be 
mathematically proved that the optimum utility (welfare) of the families that supply child labour 
deteriorates owing to labour market reform under the sufficient condition that 1 1LK CKS S .  This is 
shown as follows.  
 
Substitutions from (A.2.1), (A.3.1) and (A.21) into (2) and simplification gives the optimum 
(indirect) utility of each child labour families as  
1 2
( )* [ ( / ) ( / ) ( ) ][ ]
( )
C
C
nW WV A P P
W
  
  
        (A.28) 
 
Differentiating (A.28) with respect toU one gets 
1 2[ ( / ) ( / ) ( ) ]*( ) [ ][ ( ) ]
( )
C C
C C
dW dWA P PdV dW Wn n
dU W dU dU W dU
  

        
            1 2[ ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ][ { (1 ) } ]CC
C
dW W dWA P P W n
dU W dU
           
           1 2[ ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ][ ]CC C
dW dWA P P W l
dU dU
       
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Substitution of the expressions for CdW
dU
and dW
dU
from (A.11) into the above equation yields 
 21 2 1 1 1 1
*( ) [ ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ]( )[ ( ) ( )]L UC C C K L C K
EdV A P P W l W A C W C B
dU U
            

 
Using (A.7) and after simplification one obtains  
1 12
1 2 1
*( ) [ ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ]( )[ { ( )L UC K C C CL LL
C C
EdV WA P P W l W S S
dU U W l
         

 
                                   1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( )} ( )( )( )]CLC CC LK CK C L C
C C
WWWW S S S S l a a
W l P
       
or, 1 121 2 1
*( ) [ ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ]( )[ { ( )L UC K C C CL LL
C C
EdV WA P P W l W S S
dU U W l
         

 
                                          (+)                                                        (+)  
                                                                                             1 1( )}LC CC
C C
WW S S
W l
        (A.29) 
                                                                                                          (+) 
[Note that 1 1( ) 0C L Cl a a  . See equations (4) and (10.1).]  
 
From (A.29) it follows that 
*( ) 0dV
dU
 if 1 1LK CKS S                 (A.30) 
[This is because 1 1 *[( ) 0 0 ( ) 0]LK CK
dVS S C
dU
        .] 
From (A.30) it follows that *V falls whenU falls. Therefore, the optimum utility (welfare) of the 
families that supply child labour deteriorates owing to labour market reform under the sufficient 
condition that 1 1LK CKS S . It may be noted that there can be several other sufficient conditions 
under which *V falls whenU falls.     
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